Civil Wars

Patterns of Civil Wars

Why Study Civil Wars?

Source: blattman 2010

Where?

What is a civil war?

Armed conflict between organised actors within a state
Mostly government vs rebel group(s)
- 1,000 battle deaths
- 25 battle deaths
Government massacres excluded

Causes of Civil Wars

1. Motivation (aka grievances)

Sources of Grievances

Gains and Losses

Collective disadvantages (aka horizontal inequality)
Loss of political autonomy
Repression and Political exclusion

Sources of Grievances

Diversity?

Ethnic and religious fractionalization: Counterintuitive effect
- See also Chewas and Tumbukas article
Vertical Inequality: No discernible effect

Sources of Grievances

Climate Change?

Source: "Buhaug et al, 'One effect to rule them all? A comment on climate and conflict', Climatic Change (2014) 127:391–397

Modern empirical estimates for the effect of climate variability on civil conflict. The markers illustrate the estimated percentage change in conflict with a 1 degree increase in temperature (red), loss of rainfall (blue), increase in drought (orange), El Nino-like conditions (brown) or increase in severity of climatic natural disasters (gray). Whiskers denote the 95 % confidence interval. The solid horizontal line indicates the median climate effect with the 95 % highest density interval in grey, based on a Bayesian hierarchical model. The panels at the right show the distribution of results from all candidate studies (black) or those focusing squarely on temperature effects (red); solid lines represent the variance-weighted distribution while dashed lines depict the Bayesian hierarchical distribution. Studies listed alphabetically

Causes of Civil Wars

2. Feasibility

Greed vs. Grievances

Grievances, aka motivation
Greed, aka opportunity
- Collier: "Grievance is to a rebel organization what image is to a business"

Notes:

Source: Frieden Lake Schultz 2012, p. 215-242 At the root of all civil wars is some conflict of interests between the government and some subset of the population. two main sources: grievances and greed

Grievances: arise when the policies of the government discriminate against members of a particular group, such as by repressing their language or culture, blocking their access to jobs or political office, or denying them government services, such as education, health care, and public infrastructure. These kinds of policies can lead to vast inequalities in wealth and quality of life among groups. - fight against injustice - ethnic hatred - inequality - political repression

Greed refers to a group's desire to control more of the country's economic resources, such as by having a greater share of the profits from natural resource extraction (e.g., oil or minerals) or privilege access to jobs and government largesses. - Lust for econ/political gain; - Loot natural resources; - Gain power

Does Motivation really matter?

Ethnic tensions \(\rightarrow\) civil war

Civil war \(\rightarrow\) ethnic tensions ?

Greed

What matters is feasibility. Feasibility depends on:

Whether you can get recruits \(\rightarrow\) opportunity costs
Feasibility of fighting

Opportunity costs

Factors that lead young men (mostly) to choose fighting over other activities \(\rightarrow\) facilitates recruitment

Poverty
Fast population growth
Low economic growth / decline
- Spurious?
Education

\(\Rightarrow\) Typical profile: Young, uneducated male

Opportunity costs

Source: Blattman 2010

Feasibility

Recruiting

Problem of free-riding
Solutions
- Ideological beliefs
- Trust from same ethnic or religious group
- Forcible recruitment
- Large population

Notes:

The difficulty to mobilise in intrastate conflicts: An important problem for rebels is to mobilize people. If you do this at home for, say, an environmental cause, you need to find people willing to support, etc. But in the context of finding people willing to take up arms against the police or the military, plant bombs or blow themselves up, finding people willing to contribute is a lot harder. You also have to figure out how to buy guns, explosives, and other tools of rebellion. There is also a danger that people you approach will alert the police and you will end up in prison or worse.

What circumstances would lead you to take these risks? and how could you get others to follow you? This dilemma is the central challenge faced by rebel groups and terrorist organizations.

States have the ability to mobilise troops, so when we modeled bargaining, we assumed a given underlying power. For non-state actors, however, the problem of collective action is much more prevalent. Groups need to find like-minded individuals and motivate them to participate in the fight. And governments in conflict with such groups have to implement strategies that diminish the pool of potential supporters and/or encourage free-riding.

What can ease the free riding problem? Often individuals may be motivated by very strong religious or ideological beliefs that lead them to see contributing to the cause as beneficial in its own right. Individuals from the same ethnic or religious group may have higher levels of trust or collective solidarity ??????> easier to recruit people from the same ethnic group. ethnic groups may also be more concentrated geographically, making it easier to coordinate their activities Another way to amass fighters is through forcible recruitment, or kidnapping. The UN estimates that there are more than 250k children under the age of 18 participating in civil conflicts around the world. In the absence of strong ethnic ties, might need to compensate supporters materially. diamonds or precious minerals. E.g., Sierra Leone's blood diamonds; Colombia and cocaine trade; Taliban and poppies (heroin). Some rebel groups are essentially criminal gangs deeply engaged in smuggling, human trafficking, and extortion. Population: larger pool to recruit from, and easier to hide

Feasibility

State capability

Source: BBC

Capacity to control or regulate

Costs of collective action increase

Notes:

Political institutions: the incentive to threaten or use violence depends in part of whether the normal political process allows peaceful methods for redressing grievances. After all, fighting is very costly, so it makes sense to seek policy change or influence through existing political channels. If groups can pursue their goals by running candidates in elections or securing their rights through courts, then they have an alternative to taking up arms. This suggests that democratic countries shod have a lower risk.

But the relationship with political institutions is more complex: it also depends on the government's repressive capacity—that is, how easily it can prevent, deter, or eliminate armed opposition.

State strength also matters: ability to project power. Richer states tend to have better and stronger police and military forces as well as better ability to project their authority throughout the country. By contrast, poorer countries often have police and militaries that are not much better trained or equipped than their domestic opponents. The inability to project forces throgughough the country makes it possible for rebel groups to organise in places that are beyond the government??????s effective reach.

Feasibility

Finance: Natural Resources

Oil and Diamonds
- Highly lootable
- Provides financial resources to sustain war

Feasibility

Geography

Rugged terrain
- jungle, mountains
Infrastructures

Feasibility

Foreign Support

Direct intervention
- sending forces across the border
- provide arms, money or training
Operate from bases abroad, e.g. sanctuaries
Why would foreign governments support them?
- irredentist groups receive support from the state they want to join (e.g., Serbia and ethnic serbs)
- ethnic kin in other states (diasporas) (e.g., Irish americans support northern Ireland)
Ideology (e.g. Iran supports Hamas and Hezbollah)

Feasibility

Foreign Support

Rebel movements more likely if supported by ethnic diasporas
BUT difficulties:
- Direction of causality
- Long established diasporas vs. recent ones
- Diasporas may support state, not rebels. May be unintentional, if unilateral transfers are taxed by state and revenye used to fund military expenditure

Causes of Civil Wars

3. Bargaining Failures

3 Puzzles left

Motivation and feasibility still cannot explain:

Variation in outbreak of violence across countries
Variation in duration of conflicts
Variation in recurrence of conflicts

The Problem with Civil War

Bargaining is harder than in interstate wars:
- Fewer negotiated settlements are signed
- If signed, less likely to be implemented
- If implemented, more likely to break down
Civil wars tend to
- Last longer
- End more often in decisive military victory
- Recur more often

Explaining variation in Civil War Onset

Information Asymmetries

Particularly severe in intra-state conflicts
- Government about rebels
- Rebels about themselves
Does not explain everything: learning should occur

Notes:

If parties involved in a dispute had complete information about the outcome of a war, they would almost always prefer a settlement to the costs and risks of war

Asymmetric info is particularly severe in intra-state conflicts: - Info about the military capabilities of potential rebel groups is difficult to obtain - Size of the army - Financial flows, often subject to change - Degree of support among population - Organization - Potential rebel groups may not know their own strength without first engaging in battle and building support over time - Even if domestic groups knew their own capabilities, strong incentives to withhold this information b/c government could easily exploit it

Resources are also often subject to abrupt changes: - Outside patrons, diasporas - Rebels may enjoy the support of a foreign government early in a conflict only to lose this backing when the patron's political, economic, or ideological circumstances change. Irish-Americans were the primary source of funding for the Irish Republican Army (IRA) until Prime Minister Thatcher asked President Reagan to help stop the flow of cash - Natural resources (price fluctuations) - Rebels in Colombia, Burma, and Nepal have access to coca and poppies, but these resources are vulnerable to drought and disease, antidrug policing, and fluctuations in world demand. - Third parties - Angola's UNITA rebels lost the backing of the United States and South Africa when the ColdWar ended (after which they obtained financing by taking control of lucrative diamond fields). - Diamonds, - Oil - Agricultural products (bananas, coca) \(\rightarrow\) droughts

In addition, multiple groups seek concessions, but only a handful of them can fight \(\rightarrow\) Governments need to screen Empirical Consequences: - Uncertainty highest when the rebels's capabilities are neither so great nor meager - Uncertainty highest when monitoring is difficult - Rough terrain - Large Geographic size - Weak government forces Governments also have private info about their own willingness to fight Incentives to signal toughness when numerous potential challengers exist

But still, in long wars, information about strength or resolve should be revealed/learned \(\rightarrow\) other bargaining problems: commitment/indivisibilities.

Explaining variation in Civil War Onset

Commitment Problems

Problem of Enforcement
Commitment problems particularly acute in civil wars
- Large power asymmetry
- Settlement shifts the balance of power

Notes:

If settlement cannot be enforced over time and leaves one or both sides vulnerable to attack or abuse \(\rightarrow\) Decisive military victory preferred

Commitment problems particularly acute in civil wars Typically large power asymmetry \(\rightarrow\) easy for government to renege on promises. Government can promise to reform the political system, share power, or transfer autonomy, but little ability to punish the government it if fails to follow through. Credible commitments are particularly difficult to make to minorities. The majority almost always has the numbers to override promises made to a weaker rival, and the minority can do little to prevent this. E.g., Sunnis in Iraq, after US leaves. Iraqi Sunnis thus boycotted the January 2005 elections in part because no assurances existed that majority Shia would share power once safely in power.

Even if a domestic group is strong enough to threaten force, it will become weaker as a result of a settlement - Demobilization - Control over territory transferred to government

Explaining variation in Civil War Duration

Wars may last longer because of:
- Strong motivation
- Evenly matched combatants
- Profitability
Still does not answer why deals cannot be struck
- Pay the price
- Split in 1/2
- Soldiers can be compensated

Explaining variation in Civil War Duration

Information Problems

How much and how fast info is revealed affects duration
Info is not revealed at the same rate in every conflict
- Guerilla wars / terrorist tactics: start and stop, remote
Multiple, shifting factions, and/or outside actors

Explaining variation in Civil War Duration

Commitment Problems

Two main sources of commitment problems:
- Treaties are typically signed during periods of government weakness
- Demobilization period
Two types of countries less likely to overcome these problems
- Clear asymmetry of power
- No chance of 3rd party intervention.

Notes:

Ibos in Nigeria

Information problems do not explain why wars can drag on for many years, even when no new info is revealed

Also, even generous offers are often rejected

Two main sources of commitment problems - Treaties are typically signed during periods of government weakness \(\rightarrow\) as gvt regains strength, will have incentives to renege - Demobilization period

Two types of countries less likely to overcome these problems - Countries with clear asymmetry of power - Mutual enforcement difficult - Countries with no chance of 3rd party intervention. Empirically, countries are: - Less likely to send peacekeepers to: - countries with strong governments - countries that are democratic - countries with relatively high living standards - More likely to send them to: - Countries where the rebels are strong - Countries with low living standards - Multiple factions are involved in fighting

Explaining variation in Civil War Recurrence

Information Problems

Quality and amount of info received during first war.
Affected by:
- Duration of first war
- Outcome of first war
  - 50% of negotiated settlements relapse into war
  - 15% of decisive military victories do

Explaining variation in Civil War Recurrence

Commitment Problems

Decisive victory solves the commitment problem
Give war a chance?

Civil War Settlement

Patterns of civil war settlement

Civil wars tend to last longer than interstate wars (>10yrs)
More factions \(\rightarrow\) longer wars
Decisive victories are the norm—settlements the exception
- Governments win 40%
- Rebels 35%
- negotiated settlement: 25%
What successful negotiated settlements do:
- Divide political power
- Third party peacekeeper

Difficult choices

Terms of surrender
Movement or exchanges of populations
Release of prisoners
Return of refugees
Withdrawal of foreign forces
Disarmament + reintegration of militias
Power-sharing in government
Resources sharing
Security guarantees
Amnesty or trials
Elections and plebiscites
Verification and monitoring
Peacekeeping
External financial or military assistance
Nonintervention by neighbors
Neutral process to resolve future grievances
Human rights observance

Solutions

Power-sharing
- Lebanon
Regional autonomy and federalism
- Republika Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Ukraine?
Partition?

BELOW NOT COVERED 2016-17 \(\rightarrow\) ignore

Partition

The case for partition

Current relevance: - Iraq (?) - South Ossetia - The case for partition: hardened ethnic cleavages - Cyprus 1974 - East-West Pakistan 1971

See Sambanis, International Security, What’s in a line.

Partition: This includes cases of de jure partition, in which a new internationally recognized state is formed as a result of a successful secession (e.g., Bangladesh, Croatia, and Eritrea); and de facto partition, in which there is divided sovereignty over the territory of a single internationally recognized state (Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in Cyprus)

Case for partition: Arguments for partition rely on claims that ethnic identities are hardened by war, making interethnic cooperation difficult and increasing the risk that individuals will be targeted for violence simply because of their ethnic group membership. Thus, by physically separating ethnic groups in conflict, partition promises to reduce the risk of continued or escalating violence. This conjecture has intuitive appeal.

Examples may suggest that partition, under certain conditions, might work. - After Cyprus was repartitioned in 1974 and Greeks and Turks were forcibly separated, there was no further war in Cyprus or between Greece and Turkey; - After West and East Pakistan were partitioned in 1971, there was no war between Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) and Pakistan.

Nevertheless, these outcomes may well be idiosyncratic. India stands between Bangladesh and Pakistan, creating a long buffer zone that is hard to cross in renewed hostilities. Peace in Cyprus was partly enforced by the superior military strength of Turkey and NATO’s watchful eye

Partition

The case against partition

Eritrea-Ethiopia
Bosnia, Croatia
Somaliland
India-Pakistan
Palestine

Partition also has costs, however, as it changes political boundaries and forcibly relocates populations.

Case against partition: A cursory glance at the world, however, suggests that redrawing borders, with or without substantial physical separation of people, is often unsuccessful in reducing the risk of war recurrence. - Soon after it declared independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991,9 Croatia’s government was at war with Serb minorities in Eastern Slavonia. - After Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, the two countries fought a bloody territorial war from 1998 to 2000 and were again on the brink of war in 2005, even after a complete separation of their populations. - The de facto secession of Somaliland from Somalia in 1991 seems to have benefited Somaliland, but Somalia is a failed state with a resurgent civil war and recursive secessions in Puntland and Sool. - India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they were partitioned in 1947, and a low-level insurgency has been taking place in Kashmir for the past twenty years. - The partition of Palestine in 1948 was, by most standards, not a great success. - Other civil wars that involved ethnic groups in conflict and threatened state collapse have ended without partition, as in South Africa and Guatemala, or in the conflict between Tigreans and Amharans in Ethiopia

The case against partition

Partition can generate new conflicts

Conflict within the newly formed state

By definition, in a country where partition creates social homogeneity along any salient social cleavage, there should be no more internal conflict between the partitioned groups. That seems to be the standard used to judge the effectiveness of partition by most pro-partition scholars. But this standard is based on a narrow concept of civil war. Partition can encourage competition over power or resources such that individuals sort themselves into groups with new ethnic or class identities, and new conflicts can arise between those new groups over the type of government, redistribution, or ethnic advantage. The only reasonable standard of the effectiveness of partition is one that takes into account the complicated ways in which partition can generate new conflict. Several types of new conflict can occur following partition:

conflict within the newly formed state over control of the government; The Irish Civil War (1922–23) followed the conclusion of a 1921 treaty establishing Ireland as an autonomous unit with self-government within the British Empire. Proponents of the treaty fought advocates of complete independence

The case against partition

Partition can generate new conflicts

Conflict by a new secessionist group to
- Form a new state or
- Rejoin the rump state

The case against partition

Partition can generate new conflicts

Conflict between the new state and the rump state

The case against partition

Partition can generate new conflicts

political instability within the rump state

The case against partition

Partition can generate new conflicts

Conflict between rump state and other minorities

-Finally, conflict may arise between the government of the predecessor state and other minorities that rebel as a result of secondary consequences of partition: Following the partition of India, tribal conflicts intensified with the influx of refugees, who displaced tribal people from their ancestral lands. The Nagas rebellion in 1956 is directly related to the 1947 partition, and insurgency in Tripura was triggered by the influx of Bengali refugees from what became East Pakistan following the 1947 partition and during East Pakistan’s secession from Pakistan in 1971.

Similarly, the Assamese insurgency resulted from rapid changes in the demographic balance between Bengalis and the outnumbered Assamese. The large scale migration from Bangladesh has significantly altered demographics in India’s northeastern states, leading to social, economic, and political tensions between tribals and Bangladeshi Muslim settlers. For instance, in Assam, Muslims make up approximately 33% of Assam’s population, and 11 out of 27 districts in the state now contain Muslim majorities. Bodo leaders in Assam assert that Bangladeshi Muslims are using their growing power to impose their culture and religion in the area.

Today's lecture: Review

Explaining civil wars:

Motivation, but motivation is ubiquitous -> cannot explain variation
Feasibility, but cannot explain variation in outbreak, duration and recurrence
Bargaining failures