Berlin was divided during the cold war. Preventing a Soviet invasion of West Berlin was central to Washington's containment strategy.
Why then did the US place only a small number of under-equipped ground troops in West-Berlin?
PO 4700: Contemporary International Relations
Berlin was divided during the cold war. Preventing a Soviet invasion of West Berlin was central to Washington's containment strategy.
Why then did the US place only a small number of under-equipped ground troops in West-Berlin?
A democratic peace?
Explanations for the democratic peace
Democracy | Autocracy | |
---|---|---|
Democracy | None | Lots |
Autocracy | Lots | Lots |
War | No War | |
---|---|---|
Joint Democracy | 0 | 3,878 |
One not democractic | 32 | 25,272 |
(stable) democracies almost never fight one another.
However, democracies fight wars about as often as other types of states do.
Why?
European Imperialism 1815-1975
Cold war interventions US destabilized governments to replace them with autocratic (but anticommunist) regimes
Great power interactions. Britain, France, Germany and US: almost went to war several times
Rarity of democracies
Cold war alignments.
Slow mobilization
Surprise attack
Interesting case of realism vs Democratic peace explanations. See Schultz:
The Fashoda crisis began on September 19, 1898, when an Anglo-Egyptian expeditionary army arrived at the village of Fashoda in the Upper Nile Valley and found it occupied by a small French force.The meeting was the culmination of the two countries' race to the Upper Nile. The French band, lead by Jean Baptiste Marchand, reached Fashoda first, having come largely uncontested from the French Congo. The much larger British force, under Sir Herbert Kitchener, had been working its way south down the west bank of the Nile, fighting occasional battles against Dervish armies
Scholars from both the neorealist and democratic peace camps have considered the Fashoda crisis and declared it to be consistent with their views.
The neorealist argument is straightforward: France backed down because Britain was stronger British forces greatly outnumbered the French at Fashoda. Marchand arrived at Fashoda with roughly 120 Sengalese troops. Kitchener, by contrast, arrived with 2000 troops and had the 20,000-strong ?Grand Army of the Nile? not far behind. Britain also had the advantage at the strategic level. Its navy at the time was second to none. In terms of total tonnage, the British fleet was more than twice the size of the French fleet
The main problem with the neorealist story is that it cannot explain why the crisis happened in the first place, why it lasted almost two months, and why it escalated to the point at which war was considered imminent. The military balance described above did not appear overnight. The core problem with this argument is that it depends on factors about which decision makers had complete information at the outset of the crisis. Given the costliness of the event to French honor, to the government of Henri Brisson, and to relations between the two countries, it is not at all clear why France would have let the situation reach the point that it did if in fact the outcome was preordained and common knowledge
Theories of the democratic peace—in both their normative or institutional forms—fare no better. Consider first the normative argument, which posits that democratic states are motivated by shared liberal norms that mandate mutual respect for legitimate interests, a willingness to compromise, and a hesitancy to use or threaten force as a means of dispute settlement. BUT: The British position was entirely unyielding ? to the point that Prime Minister Salisbury refused even to call discussions between the two countries' negotiations. Intransigence was backed by a willingness to threaten war, a step the cabinet took on October 28, when it ordered the mobilization of the fleet. British public opinion was more nationalistic than liberal. As Sir William Harcourt noted, ?We shall either see the submission of France which will be popular or a war with France which will be more popular still?
Institutional argument is no better: If anything, public opinion did not refrain but embolden leaders What democracy does is help signal intentions better. The crisis started out of incomplete information: the french never thought that the british would rather fight than compromise.
How signaled? Public opinion was such that the political risks of war were small while the political risks of compromise were potentially large. As predicted by Fearon (1992, 1994a), signals from the government were sent in a way that entailed high and visible audience costs. They were made publicly, in full view of the British electorate, and they were designed to arouse public opinion so that it would be difficult for the government to later back down. At the same time, the move had tremendous signaling value. By publicizing Britain?s stance in such an unusual manner, Salisbury effectively painted himself into a corner: retreat from this position would entail substantial political costs. The impact of the move was not lost on contemporaries. The day the blue book was published, The Times noted: ?We cannot conceal from ourselves that Lord Salisbury and his colleagues have taken a position from which retreat is impossible. One side or the other will have to give way. That side cannot, after the publication of these papers, be Great Britain. Despite the clarity of this message, Riker (1929) argues that the success of these threats was due in large part to the approval they received from outside the governing party. Support from other elements of society ? and especially those with different preferences from the government ? was crucial.
How about France? Whereas the British government made forceful signals that were intended to commit it to an intransigent position, the French government was much more cautious about making public commitments. Whereas Salisbury enjoyed support from across the political spectrum, Delcass? found himself in the cross-fire between the anti-imperialist left and the pro-imperialist right. In short, whereas Britain signaled unanimity and resolve, France could not hide obvious indicators of division and weakness.
Countries that in the process of democratizing are more likely to be involved in military disputes
The soldiers were a trip-wire. Their deaths would have tied Washington's hands. ==> A credible deterrence mechanism.